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Abstract. The importance of employing machine learning for malware
detection has become explicit to the security community. Several anti-
malware vendors have claimed and advertised the application of machine
learning in their products in which the inference phase is performed on
servers and high-performance machines, but the feasibility of such ap-
proaches on mobile devices with limited computational resources has not
yet been assessed by the research community, vendors still being skepti-
cal. In this paper, we aim to show the practicality of devising a learning-
based anti-malware on Android mobile devices, first. Furthermore, we
aim to demonstrate the significance of such a tool to cease new and eva-
sive malware that can not easily be caught by signature-based or offline
learning-based security tools. To this end, we first propose the extraction
of a set of lightweight yet powerful features from Android applications.
Then, we embed these features in a vector space to build an effective
as well as efficient model. Hence, the model can perform the inference
on the device for detecting potentially harmful applications. We show
that without resorting to any signatures and relying only on a training
phase involving a reasonable set of samples, the proposed system, named
IntelliAV 34, provides more satisfying performances than the popular
major anti-malware products. Moreover, we evaluate the robustness of
IntelliAV against common obfuscation techniques where most of the
anti-malware solutions get affected.
Keywords: Android, Malware Detection, Machine Learning, On-Device, Ten-
sorFlow, Mobile Security, Classification, Obfuscation, Dropper
1 Introduction
Android is the most popular platform for mobile devices, with almost 85% of
the market share in the first quarter of 2017 [2]. More interestingly, Android is
now the most popular operating system connected to the Internet after overtak-
ing Windows [3]. The majority of the security issues affecting Android systems
? Corresponding author: m.ahmadi@northeastern.edu
3 This paper is the extended version of IntelliAV conference paper [1]
4 IntelliAV application is available online: http://www.intelliav.com
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can be attributed to third-party applications (app) rather than to the Android
OS itself. According to a report in 2017 from G DATA (a security vendor), a
new instance of Android malware emerges nearly every 10 seconds [4]. Besides,
another recent report from McAfee shows that the malware infection rate of An-
droid mobile devices is soaring [5]. We believe that this huge amount of mobile
malware needs to be timely detected, possibly by intelligent tools running on
the device, because it has been shown that malware can bypass offline security
checks (e.g., by relying on so-called droppers, that load the malicious payload
after being activated), and live in the wild for a while. In fact, to the best of our
knowledge, even the most recent versions of Android anti-malware products are
still not satisfactory to cope with most of the novel and obfuscated malware.
Today, machine learning is one of the most successful helper techniques for
Android malware detection and classification [6,7,8,9]. The recent advances in
the optimization of machine learning tools that can execute on mobile platforms,
such as Android [10], increase the possibility of empowering security applications
with machine learning tools. Despite the improvement in processor and RAM of
mobile devices, the development of any mobile anti-malware product should take
into account the processing time to avoid battery drain, in particular when ma-
chine learning techniques are employed, as they are known to be computational
demanding. On the other hand, we observe that a learning-based Android anti-
malware product does not need to be necessarily sophisticated, as it has been
shown that Android malware seems to perform simpler tasks than the desktop
counterparts [11]. All the reasons above stimulate a proposal for an on-device
machine learning solution to detect potential malicious applications.
Contribution. Accordingly, in this paper, we introduce an intelligent risk-
based anti-malware approach for Android devices, called IntelliAV, which is
built on top of the open-source and multi-platform TensorFlow library. In fact,
we illustrate the feasibility and the advantages of such an approach on the device
by leveraging on the existing literature, and, in particular, on previous works by
the authors, to tackle the deficiencies of existing Android anti-malware products,
mostly based on pattern matching techniques, as well as offline learning-based
approaches. As far as we know, the performances of learning-based malware de-
tection systems for Android have been only tested off-device, i.e., with the avail-
ability of computational power and memory space well beyond the capabilities
of mobile devices. More specifically, the three main contributions of IntelliAV
are as follows:
(i) We design a system relying on a trained model on a sizeable set of applica-
tions. The model is carefully constructed to be both effective and efficient
by wisely selecting a set of lightweight, discriminative, and effective fea-
tures. Moreover, the model is precisely validated by tuning its parameters
to be practical for the capabilities of Android devices. We then show how
the crafted model can be embedded in the IntelliAV application, and can
readily be deployed on Android devices.
(ii) The performances of IntelliAV are evaluated through a cross-validation
process, where our system can achieve 92% detection rate, that is compa-
rable to other off-device learning-based Android malware detection while
relying on a comparatively small set of features. Moreover, as a supple-
mentary experiment, IntelliAV is analyzed on two different sets of more
recent malware samples with respect to the samples included in the training
specimens. Interestingly, IntelliAV can achieve 96% detection rate from an
independent test by a 3rd party organization, and it obtains 72% detection
rate —on a set of randomly gathered apps by us— that is higher than the
performances of the top 5 commercial Android anti-malware products.
(iii) To understand the robustness of IntelliAV, we evaluate the impact of two
common evasion techniques, i.e., dropper and obfuscation, on the proposed
system. For droppers, interestingly, we show how IntelliAV can stop them
on the device while offline machine learning techniques would fail to detect.
For the second examination, we prove the power of IntelliAV on identifying
heavily obfuscated malware, which perfectly shows how machine learning can
add to the cost evasion.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
First, we highlight the importance of an on-device risk-based malware detection
(§2) and review the existing works on this area (§3). Next, we reveal the structure
of IntelliAV, motivating the choice of features, and the procedure followed to
construct the model (§4). We then assess the approach (§5) and remark the
limitations of IntelliAV (§6). Finally, we conclude our paper discussing future
directions of IntelliAV (§7).
2 Motivation of having a Risk-based On-Device Approach
There are several incentives for the security community to develop a risk-based
mobile security approach, possibly based on machine learning, as well as per-
forming real-time on the mobile device in addition to employing it on servers.
2.1 Malware in Google Play store
There have been various reports on the practicability of by-passing Google se-
curity mechanisms by malware coders. Consequently, malware keeps sneaking
on the Google Play store and remains accessible to users until a security ven-
dor/researcher reports it to Google as harmful. For instance, the Check Point
security firm described a zero-day mobile ransomware found on Google Play in
January 2017 [12]. This malware was dubbed as a Charger application and more
than a million users downloaded this app. Another report from the same vendor
indicates the case of new variants of the famous Android malware family Hum-
mingBad [13] on Google Play. Another specimen of malware that could infiltrate
Google Play is a packed malware that sends fraudulent premium SMS messages
and charges users for fake services without their knowledge [14]. More detail on
vetting these samples is available in Section 5.2.
2.2 Install Malware from unknown sources
Third-party app stores are popular among mobile users because they usually
offer applications at great discounts, as well as users from specific countries
can find there those applications whose access is restricted by the Google Play
store according to each country’s rules. Nevertheless, security checks on the
third-party stores are not as effective as those available in the Google Play
store. Therefore, third-party markets are a breeding ground for mobile malware
propagation, and this fact sometimes leads people to download spoofed versions
of well-known applications. A large number of reports on malicious applications
found in these stores have been published during the past few years. In addition
to the third-party markets, direct download from unknown websites is another
source of infection. It is quite often that users can be eluded by fake tempting
titles like free games when browsing the web, so that applications are downloaded
and installed directly on devices from untrusted websites. Another source of
contamination is though phishing SMS messages that contain links to malicious
applications. Recent reports by Lookout and Google [15,16] show how a targeted
attack malware, namely Chrysaor, which is presumed of infecting devices via a
phishing attack, could remain undetected for a few years. More detail on vetting
these samples is available in Section 5.2.
2.3 Distribute malware in supply chain
Users of mobile devices are frequently recommended by information security
experts to be cautious when downloading applications from untrusted sources or
even when they install not very popular apps from Google Play. However, there
are fewer warnings for the users on the reliability of safety claims of new devices,
especially when they might be shipped with pre-installed malware. Despite the
concerns of manufacturers on securing the ‘supply chain’, it can be compromised
by attackers, for the number of people and companies involved in the supply
chain of the components. There is a recent report that shows how devious hackers
spread malware on Android devices somewhere along the supply chain before the
user obtained the phone [17]. More detail on vetting these samples is available
in Section 5.2.
2.4 Easy to evade pattern matching
Almost all of the major Android anti-malware kernels operate, to the extent
of our knowledge, by matching signatures or patterns. These types of scanning
engines let both malware variants of known families, as well as zero-day malware
threaten our own devices. There are claims by a few Android anti-malware ven-
dors on the use of heuristic approaches like machine learning in their products.
However, no evidence regarding the implementation of the kernel including ma-
chine learning on the device is available. Hence, to find out further, we evaluate
them on very recent malware samples, as well as on a few obfuscated malware
samples. More detail is available in Section 5.2 and Section 5.4.
2.5 Droppers dodge offline vetting tools
A typical kind of evasion technique employed by any malware to evade off-device
vetting mechanisms is by developing droppers, and Android malware makes no
exception [18]. Droppers don’t directly perform malicious activities, and they
are designed to install some sort of malicious application to a device. Therefore,
detecting droppers is not a straightforward task even by advanced off-device
machine learning techniques as a dropper itself usually exhibits a few standard
behaviors that are common in legitimate applications as well, so that it does
not obviously reveal malicious actions. We analyze a few representative malware
samples using this attack vector in Section 5.3.
2.6 Conclusion
All of the above observations encourage to empower Android devices with a
machine-learning anti-malware engine, either as a complement to pattern match-
ing techniques, or as an independent complete solution.
3 Related Work
The problem of detecting Android malware through machine learning approaches
has been explored quite a lot since 2010 [19]. While an entire overview is outside
of the scope of this paper, we suggest the interested reader resorting to one of
the recent surveys on this subject, e.g., the taxonomy proposed in [20]. Addi-
tionally, it is out of the scope of the paper a review of dynamic malware analysis
approaches [21,6,22] as dynamic analysis has its specific advantages and pitfalls.
For instance, we are dealing with an on-device tool, and it is not officially possible
that a process accesses system calls of another process without root privileges,
which makes the dynamic analysis approaches almost impractical on the end
user device. Hence, we provide here some of the more closely relevant papers
that rely on static analysis technique. The existing methods are classified into
two distinct levels, namely off-device and on-device malware detection.
3.1 Off-Device Malware Detection
Offline testing usually has no hard computational restrictions, thanks to the
availability of computational power compared to the one available on mobile de-
vices. Some of the prominent malware detection models are MudFlow [23], Ap-
pAudit [24], and DroidSIFT [25] relying on information flow analysis[26], while
DroidMiner [8], and MaMaDroid [27] are based on API sequences. Although this
allows constructing complex models capable of detecting malware with a very
high accuracy, the use of elaborate features such as information flows and API
sequences makes these approach harder to be carried out on the device. Lighter
approaches, such as Drebin [7], DroidAPIMiner [28], and DroidSieve [9] that
make use of meta-data, as well as syntactic features, allow for their porting to
on-device applications.
3.2 On-Device Malware Detection
Based on the best of our knowledge, there are a few approaches in the research
community that used machine learning for on-device malware detection, and
none of them is publicly available for performance comparison. Drebin [7] is one
of them, which has been cited the most on this topic. While the paper shows
some screenshots of the UI, the application itself is not available. Besides, while
the proposed system is for both workstation and mobile devices, the actual needs
for a learning-based malware detection engine on the device was not specified.
Among the commercial Android anti-malware tools, two of them claim to use
machine learning techniques, as reported in Section 5.2, but the extent to which
machine learning is used in these tools is not disclosed. Finally, Qualcomm re-
cently announced the development of a machine learning tool for on-device mo-
bile phone security, but the details of the system, as well as its performances,
are not publicly available [29].
Year Method
Detection
Feature
On-Device Available
2014 DroidAPIMiner [28] − − API,PKG,PAR
2014 DroidMiner [8] − − CG,API SEQ
2014 Drebin [7] 3 − PER,STR,API,INT
2014 DroidSIFT [25] − − API-F
2015 AppAudit [24] − 3 API-F
2015 MudFlow [23] − 3 API-F
2017 MaMaDroid [27] − 3 CG,API SEQ
2017 DroidSieve [9] − − API,PER,INT,PN,STR,ST
2017 Qualcomm [29] 3 − Not Available
Ours IntelliAV 3 3 PER,INT,API,ST
API: Application Programming Interface, API-F: Information Flow between APIs, INT: Intents, CG:
Call Graph, SEQ: Sequence, PER: Requested Permissions, STR: Embedded strings, ST: Statistical
features, PN: Package names
Table 1: Android Malware detection techniques based on machine learning tech-
niques and static analysis. All of the systems that are mostly based on API,
API-F, and API SEQ would fail against reflection. IntelliAV is the only on-
device system that is available in the market.
3.3 Summary
As an overall comparison (see Table 1) with the previous approaches, we believe
that IntelliAV provides for an effective and practical on-device anti-malware
solution for Android systems, totally based on machine learning techniques.
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Fig. 1: Overview of IntelliAV.
IntelliAV is available online, and can move a step toward having an advanced
security tool on mobile devices.
4 System Design
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the proposed IntelliAV system. Its design
consists of the following two main phases:
(i) Training the model offline. As a first step, we resort to a conventional
computing environment to build a classification model. To conduct the train-
ing phase, we gathered a relatively large number of applications (§5.1). Then,
a carefully selected set of characteristics (features) is extracted from the
applications to learn a discriminant function allowing the distinction be-
tween malicious and benign behaviors (§4.1). Next, a classification function
is learned by associating each feature vector to the type of applications it
has been extracted from, i.e., malware or goodware (§4.2).
(ii) Model operation on the device. As the second phase, the optimized
model is embedded in the IntelliAV Android application so that IntelliAV
can produce a risk score for each downloaded APK or installed apps on the
device, without resorting to any external interaction, e.g., with cloud services
(§4.3).
4.1 Feature Engineering
The feature extraction step is the core phase for any learning-based system. To
address Android malware detection, the security community has suggested var-
ious types of features as discussed in Section3. However, some sets of features
related to primary Android functions, like permissions, APIs, and Intents, usu-
ally allow achieving reasonable detection results, with the aim to alert for the
presence of probably harmful applications [7,9]. Extracting this set of features
is also feasible on mobile devices because they do not need deep static analysis,
thus expecting a limited computational effort.
With the aim of extracting a set of efficient and effective features for our
proposed system, we resort to the following four categories of characteristics.
Three of them are derived from the ‘manifest ’ of Android applications, namely
Permissions, Intent Filters, components statistics, and the fourth one is extracted
from the DEX code, notably APIs. A typical Android app has a single DEX
file, and most of the standard malware detection approaches focus on this file.
Because of the Dalvik Executable specification, the total number of methods
that can be referenced within a single DEX file is limited to 65,536 -including
Android framework methods, library methods, and methods in the code. This
limitation can be handled by multidex configuration if an application extends
to more than 65K methods. Therefore, multidex can be a desirable technique
for Android malware to split the payload into multiple DEX files to make the
detection harder [30]. For this reason, to be more comprehensive in the terms
of extracting the characteristics of apps, IntelliAV has to parse all of the DEX
files of an application although it makes the feature extraction process somewhat
slower (see section 5.5).
To construct the feature vector, we consider all the permissions and the
intent-filters inquired by the samples included in the training set. Besides, four
statistical features from application’s components such as the total number of
activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers are added to the
feature vector as they can reveal somewhat the extent of abilities each application
has. For instance, the number of activities in many malware categories is usually
fewer than the number of activities available in goodware, except for the case of
malware that is built by repackaging benign applications. Moreover, we manually
select a set of 179 APIs as features and include them in the feature vector.
The selected APIs are those that reveal some particular characteristics of the
application that are known to be peculiar to either goodware or malware. For
instance, the invoke API from the java.lang.reflect.Method class shows
whether an application uses reflection (i.e., a technique for hiding APIs) or not.
Note that permissions and APIs are coded as binary features, which means that
their value is either one or zero depending on the feature being or not present
in the application. If we considered the number of permissions, we would have
ended up with useless information, as each permission needs to be declared just
once in the manifest. The same reasoning motivates the use of binary feature to
represent API usage. The main reason is that although it is possible to get the
count of the usage of an API in an application, the procedure would increase the
processing time without producing more useful information so that we ignored
it. By contrast, intent-filters are integer-valued features, as they represent the
number of times an intent-filter is declared in the manifest. Considering this
count for intent-filter features makes them more meaningful rather than simply
Table 2: Features used in IntelliAV.
Category Number of Features Type
Meta-Data
Permissions 322 Binary
Intent Filters 503 Count
Statistical 4 Count
Dex Code
APIs 171 Binary
considering their presence or not in the application. Similarly, the application’s
components are represented as integer-valued features, as we count the number
of components for each different type (e.g., activities, services, etc.).
In total, the feature vector contains 4000 features. To avoid overfitting and
make IntelliAV faster on the mobile device, we decided to reduce the number
of features by selecting the most discriminative ones through a feature selection
procedure (see Section 4.2). During the feature selection step, we consider four
thresholds, namely, 25%, 50%, and 75% of the top features, as well as the whole
feature set. Interestingly, a model containing 25% (i.e., 1000) of the top features
can achieve the best result while uses fewer features. Therefore, the final assort-
ment consists of 322 features related to permissions, 503 features linked to Intent
filters, four statistical features from components (e.g., count of activities), and
171 features associated with API usage (see Table 2).
4.2 Model Construction
As we mentioned earlier, the model needs to be trained on a workstation, and
it is not necessary to conduct the training phase on the device because it has to
be performed once we need to update the model according to the evolution of
malware. In other words, in contrast to pattern matching techniques, our system
does not require frequent updates by the end user, which diminishes the amount
of computation and network traffic transferred. The number of times the model
needs to be updated should be quite small, as reports showed that just the 4%
of the total number of Android malware is actually from new malware families
[31].
To discriminate malware from goodware, we need to rely on binary classifica-
tion techniques. Over the past years, a large number of classification techniques
have been proposed by the scientific community, and the choice of the most suit-
able classifier for a given task is often guided by preceding experience in different
domains, as well as by trial-and-error procedures. However, among all of the ex-
isting classifiers, Random Forest classifier [32] have shown high performances in
a variety of tasks [33]. The Random Forests algorithm belongs to the ensemble
learning methods in which many decision trees are constructed at training time
by randomly selecting the features used by each decision tree. Eventually, the
algorithm outputs the class of an instance at the testing time based on the com-
bined decision of the tress. One of the main reasons that Random forest models
often achieve better results compared to others is that it is an ensemble classi-
fier, which means it helps to reduce the variance in performances of the decision
trees. So, the final model exhibits low bias and low variance, which makes the
model more robust against both the underfitting and overfitting problems [34].
We build IntelliAV on the top of TensorFlow [35] library to be able to
train our model offline, as well as to test it on Android devices. TensorFlow is
an open source library for machine learning, which was published by Google in
November 2015. A TensorFlow model is highly portable as it supports the vast
majority of platforms such as Linux, Mac OS, Windows, and mobile computing
platforms like Android and iOS. TensorFlow computations are expressed as data
flow graphs. Nodes in the graph represent mathematical operations, while the
graph edges represent the multidimensional data arrays (tensors) communicating
between them. To the best of our knowledge, IntelliAV is the first anti-malware
tool that has proposed employing TensorFlow. More specifically, we employ an
implementation of Random Forests in TensorFlow, called TensorForest [36].
To simplify the learning task and reduce the risk of the so-called overfitting
problem, i.e., to avoid that the model fits the training set but exhibits a low
generalization capability with respect to new unknown specimens, we employ
feature selection to reduce the size of the feature set by excluding irrelevant and
noisy features. In particular, as done in [37], we computed the so-called mean
decrease impurity score for each feature, and retained those features which have
been assigned the highest scores. Note that the mean decrease impurity technique
is often referred to as the Gini impurity, or information gain criterion.
4.3 On-Device Testing
As we mentioned before, TensorFlow facilitates the task of using machine learn-
ing models on mobile devices. So, we embed the trained model, obtained ac-
cording to the procedure described in Section 4.2, in IntelliAV. It is important
to acknowledge that as far as the model is resident on the device and not in
the cloud, the network traffic generated by IntelliAV is zero, compared to ap-
proaches that communicate with the cloud by sending a hash/APK to obtain
the risk associated to an app.
The size of TensorFlow models depends on the complexity of the model. For
instance, if the number of trees in the TensorForest model increases, consequently
the size of the model increases as well. The size of IntelliAV model that we
transferred to the device is about 14.1MB. Having said that, when it is embedded
into the APK and because the model is originally saved in a textual format, the
final size of the model after compression in the APK becomes just 3.3MB.
Whenever an application needs to be tested, first, IntelliAV loads the model,
then extracts the features from the application on the device, and finally, it
feeds the model by the extracted features to acquire the application’s risk type.
The model provides a likelihood value between 0 and 1, denoting the degree
of maliciousness of the application. Then, the likelihood is thresholded to three
types of risks to make it more understandable for the end user. We empirically
provide the following guideline for interpreting the likelihood. If the likelihood is
lower than 0.4, the risk is low and we suggest the user consider the application
as safe. If the likelihood is between 0.4 and 0.6, then the application should be
removed if the application is not so popular in Google Play or if the user is not
sure about the trustworthiness of the source application. Finally, the application
has to be removed with high confidence if the likelihood is higher than 0.6.
These thresholds have been set after testing the system on a set containing
different applications. It is worth to mention that the analyses of apps that
identify potential harmful apps may yield both false positives and false negatives.
As shown in figure 2, the two main capabilities of IntelliAV are the verifica-
tion of the risk of all the installed applications on the device (Quick Scan), as well
as analyzing the risk of downloaded/dropped APKs (Custom Scan). The latter
ability is necessary as it helps the user to check the risk of the application before
installation. One of the prominent use cases of this ability is stopping droppers
on the device, while offline machine learning systems can be simply lured by the
use of droppers in malware (see Section 5.3). For the Custom Scan, IntelliAV
needs the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permission to access the contents of the ap-
plication’s package on the external storage. For the Quick Scan, IntelliAV has
to read base.apk file in a sub-directory with a name corresponding to the pack-
age name, which is located in the /data/app/ directory. As far as the permission
of base.apk file is -rw-r--r--, which means every user can read the content of
this file, IntelliAV needs neither any permission nor a rooted device to evaluate
the installed applications.
5 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we address the following research questions:
– Is IntelliAV able to detect new and unseen malware (§5.2 and §5.2)?
– Are the performances of IntelliAV comparable to the ones of popular mo-
bile anti-malware products, although IntelliAV is completely based on ma-
chine learning techniques (§5.2)?
– How much is IntelliAV robust against prevalent evasion techniques like
droppers (§5.3) and obfuscation (§5.4)?
– Which is the overhead of IntelliAV on real devices (§5.5)?
Before addressing these questions, we explain the experimental settings and
the data used for building our model (§5.1).
5.1 Experimental Setup
To train IntelliAV, we have collected 19,722 applications from VirusTotal[38],
divided into 10,058 benign and 9,664 malicious applications. We considered the
diversity of malicious applications, by including samples belonging to different
categories, such as Adware, Ransomware [39], and GCM malware [40]. In ad-
dition, in order to cover the variety of malware characteristics throughout its
evolution during time, we also take into account samples from the first versions
(a) Scan installed applications (b) Scan an APK
Fig. 2: IntelliAV abilities.
of Android malware, namely January 2011, until recent versions as of December
2016. We consider an application as being malicious if it was tagged as being
malware by at least 10 of the tools used by VirusTotal.
The whole process of feature extraction and model construction was carried
out on a laptop with a 2 GHz quad-core processor and 8GB of memory. The
two metrics that have been used for assessing the performance of our approach
were the False Positive Rate (FPR) and the True Positive Rate (TPR). FPR is
the percentage of goodware samples misclassified as badware, while TPR is the
fraction of correctly-detected badware samples (also known as detection rate). A
Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) curve reports TPR against FPR for
all possible model’s decision thresholds, which can help to find the best decision
threshold by considering the trade-off.
5.2 Results
To adequately evaluate the effectiveness of IntelliAV, the following scenarios
were considered.
Cross Validation One might fit a model on the training set very well so that the
model will perfectly classify all of the samples that are used during the training
phase. However, this might not provide the model with the generalization capa-
bility, and that’s why we evaluated the model by a cross-validation procedure to
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Fig. 3: ROC curve of TensorForest (5-fold cross validation). FPR and TPR are
respectively 4.2% and 92.5%.
find the optimum-tuned parameters to be used for building the final model as a
trade-off between correct detection and generalization capability. Consequently,
we evaluate IntelliAV on the set of applications described in Section 5.1 through
a 5-fold cross-validation procedure, to provide statistically-sound results. In this
validation technique, samples are divided into 5 groups, called folds, with al-
most equal sizes. The prediction model is created using 4 folds, and then it is
tested on the final remaining fold. The procedure is repeated 5 times on different
folds to be sure that each data point is evaluated exactly once. We repeat the
procedure by running the Random Forest algorithm multiple times to obtain
the most appropriate parameters while keeping the size of the model lower. The
ROC of the best-fitted model is shown in Figure 3. The values of FPR and TPR
are respectively 4.2% and 92.5% which is quite acceptable although the set of
considered features is relatively small, namely 1000 features.
Evaluation on the training set Although cross-validation is important for
setting the model parameters, we do not desire the model exhibit high misclas-
sification on the training samples. Therefore, as an additional investigation to
verify the effectiveness of the tuned parameters based on the cross-validation
procedure explained in Section 5.2, we test the model, which was constructed
on all 19.7K samples, on the same set, namely on all the samples used for train-
ing. Table 3 shows the classification results on the training set. It shows that
Table 3: Training on the set of samples explained in Section 5.1 and testing on
the same set. GT refers to the Ground-truth of samples.
Train Test
#Samples GT (#Samples)
Classified as
Malicious Benign
19,722
Malicious (9,664) 9,640 24
(TPR = 99.75%)
Benign (10,058) 7 10,051
(FPR = 0.07%)
IntelliAV misclassifies just a few training samples. This confirms how the model
is carefully fitted on the training set, so that is able to correctly classify almost all
of the training samples with very high accuracy, while it avoids being overfitted.
Evaluation on new Malware To realize the sustainability [41] of our model
during a period of 3 months after the model is deployed, we examine the per-
formance system on a set made up of 2311 malware samples, and 2898 benign
applications, that have been first seen by VirusTotal between January and March
of 2017. We consider an application as being malicious when it was labeled as
malware by at least 5 of the tools used by VirusTotal. This set of test samples
contains randomly selected applications that were newer than the samples in the
training set, and thus they were not part of the training set.
As shown in Table 4, the detection rate on the test set is 71.96%, which
is quite satisfying if compared with the performances of other Android anti-
malware solutions that are available in the market (See Section 5.2). Moreover,
the false positive rate is around 7.52%, which is acceptable if we consider that
an individual user typically installs a few dozen applications, and thus it might
receive a false alert occasionally. This casual alert allows the user that the ap-
plication has some characteristics similar to badware, and so it can be used only
if the source is trusted. It is also worth remarking that our classification of false
positives is linked to the ground-truth classification provided by VirusTotal at
the time of evaluation. It is not unlikely that some of these applications might
turn out to be classified as malware by other anti-malware tools in the near fu-
ture, as we have already noticed during the experiments. We expect in a future
work to show how many applications were correctly predicted as being malicious
before their signatures were created. However, our experience suggests that even
if the application is benign but labeled as being potentially risky by IntelliAV,
then the user might look for less risky alternatives applications in Google Play
[42]. In fact, we believe that people should be aware of some applications that
might be potentially harmful, even if it turns out not to be so, rather than
missing some real threats.
Challenging Modern AV vendors There is a growth in the number of anti-
malware vendors that resort to machine learning approaches [38]. However, the
Table 4: Training on the set of samples described in Section 5.1, and testing on
new samples in 2017. GT refers to the Ground-truth of samples.
Train Test
#Samples GT (#Samples)
Classified as
Malicious Benign
19,722
Malicious (2311) 1,663 648
(TPR = 71.96%)
Benign (2898) 218 2,680
(FPR = 7.52%)
foremost focus of these products appears to be on desktop malware, especially
Windows PE malware. Based on the publicly available information, there are
just a few pieces of evidence of two anti-malware vendors that use machine
learning for Android malware detection, namely Symantec[43] and TrustLook
[44], and their products are installed by more than 10 million users. Despite the
lack of clearance of using machine learning by these tools to us, we consider
them as two candidates for comparison with IntelliAV. To provide a rational
comparison, in addition to the Symantec and Trustlook products, we choose
three other Android anti-malware products, i.e., AVG, Avast, and Qihoo 360,
that are the most popular security tools among Android users as they have been
installed more than 100 million times.5
We compared the performances of IntelliAV on the test dataset (see Sec-
tion 5.2) with the ones attained by these five popular Android anti-malware. As
shown in Figure 4, IntelliAV performs slightly better than two of the products
used for comparison, while it outperforms the other three. As we gathered the
label assigned by anti-malware products to the test samples at most two months
after they are first seen in VirusTotal, the comparison could be more interesting
if we had the label given to samples at the time they are first seen in the wild.
As a supplementary experiment, we carried out a measurement in detection
performance by considering a set of top and very recent malware threats reported
by four vendors, namely Check Point, Fortinet, Lookout, and Google (see Ta-
ble 5). The considerable performances of IntelliAV compared to the ones of
other products, confirms the effectiveness of the selected lightweight features
and the training procedure, especially if we consider that 21 of the analyzed
samples were first seen before 2017, so it is expected that they can be detected
by anti-malware tools either by signatures, or by the generalization capability
provided by their machine learning engines. If we have a close look at the two
misclassified samples by IntelliAV (Table 5), we can see that the associated
risk scores are quite close to the decision threshold that we set at training time.
The main reasons for the misclassification of these two samples can be related
to the use of the runtime.exec API to run some shell commands, and to the
presence of native-code, that is used to hide some of their malicious behaviors.
5 http://www.androidrank.org/
Table 5: Point to point comparison of IntelliAV and three anti-malware ven-
dors on some recent and well-known malware reported by Check Point, Fortinet,
Lookout, and Google from January to April of 2017. These samples were evalu-
ated on an Android emulator. The time column refers to the required time for
performing both feature extraction and classification on the emulator.
IntelliAV 2017 check
# MD5 Size Unseen time(s) Risk Score AV1 AV3 AV5 VT 1st check
Reported malware by Checkpoint [17,12,13,14]
1 60806c69e0f4643609dcdf127c8e7ef5 66 KB 3 0.38 83% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2016-01 (02/56)
2 fcbb243294bb87b039f113352a8db158 12.4 MB 3 0.40 37% (7) (3) (7) (7) 2016-03 (19/55)
3 4e91ff9ac7e3e349b5b9fe36fb505cb4 48 KB 3 0.37 93% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2016-03 (13/57)
4 944850ee0b7fc774c055a2233478bb0f 842 KB 3 0.51 98% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2014-02 (00/48)
5 629da296cba945662e436bbe10a5cdaa 3.7 MB 3 0.69 92% (3) (3) (7) (3) 2014-07 (13/51)
6 1aac52b7d55f4c1c03c85ed067bf69d9 3.5 MB 3 0.75 94% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2013-11 (23/47)
7 379ec59048488fdb74376c4ffa00d1be 2.2 MB 3 0.57 79% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2015-09 (26/56)
8 d5f5480a7b29ffd51c718b63d1ffa165 9.1 MB 3 0.82 89% (3) (3) (7) (7) 2015-12 (03/55)
9 4d904a24f8f4c52726eb340b329731dd 13.2 MB 3 0.95 72% (3) (3) (7) (7) 2014-08 (11/51)
10 59b62f8bc982b31d5e0411c74dbe0897 2.5 MB 3 0.45 83% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2016-01 (31/55)
11 9ed38abb335f0101f55ad20bde8468dc 8.1 MB 3 0.77 67% (3) (3) (7) (7) 2016-02 (16/55)
12 4a3a7b03c0d0460ed8c5beff5c20683c 575 KB 3 0.42 68% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2017-03 (00/55)
13 660638f5212ef61891090200c354a6d5 32.7 MB 3 1.13 96% (3) (3) (7) (3) 2016-07 (13/55)
14 f48122e9f4333ba3bb77fac869043420 349 KB 3 0.40 81% (3) (3) (7) (3) 2015-09 (04/57)
15 0e987ba8da76f93e8e541150d08e2045 12.8 MB 3 0.98 88% (3) (3) (7) (7) 2017-03 (07/60)
16 51c328fccf1a8b4925054136ccdb1cda 874 KB 3 0.44 83% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2014-08 (05/53)
17 3f188b9aa8f739ee0ed572992a21b118 1.57 MB 3 0.48 89% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2014-04 (24/51)
18 7fff1e78089eb387b6adfa595385b2c9 13.4 MB 3 0.52 63% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2015-03 (02/57)
19 2b83bd1d97eb911e9d53765edb5ea79e 2.3 MB 3 0.43 77% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2017-01 (16/58)
20 48ff097022ea7886b53f80edf2972033 1.3 MB 3 0.47 63% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2017-03 (28/59)
21 a3836485ecac78f576e1753269350824 14.6 MB 3 0.84 38% (7) (7) (7) (7) 2016-12 (14/57)
22 a4e75471dbf0bb0d3ec26d854cb7fe12 14.1 MB 3 0.72 62% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2016-12 (10/56)
23 7253e0a13d2d1db1547e9984a4ce7abd 1.3 MB 3 0.57 63% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2017-03 (26/59)
24 84a62599a40e36be2180485245e8123f 5.7 MB 3 0.17 81% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2017-05 (02/62)
25 c2132651331a77d41a323fefa71bfbd0 5.1 MB 3 0.29 87% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2017-05 (04/59)
Reported malware by Fortinet [45,46,47,48]
26 193058ae838161ee4735a9172ebc25ec 1.4 MB 3 0.56 89% (3) (3) (7) (7) 2017-01 (05/24)
27 f479f2a29354a8b889cb529a2ee2c1b4 1.1 MB 3 0.35 61% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2017-03 (12/59)
28 cad94ac28640c771b1d2de5e786dc352 776 KB 3 0.37 96% (3) (3) (3) (7) 2016-11 (20/56)
29 40507254b8156de817f02c0ed111e99f 0.2 MB 3 0.37 83% (3) (3) (3) (3) 2016-11 (08/57)
Reported malware by Lookout and Google [15,16]
30 cc9517aafb58279091ac17533293edc1 57 KB 3 0.63 89% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2016-02 (00/53)
31 7c3ad8fec33465fed6563bbfabb5b13d 252 KB 3 0.37 82% (3) (7) (3) (7) 2017-04 (03/60)
32 3a69bfbe5bc83c4df938177e05cd7c7c 19 KB 3 0.36 81% (3) (7) (7) (7) 2017-04 (01/60)
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Fig. 4: Comparison between the detection rate of IntelliAV with top five Android
anti-malware. We didn’t put the name of vendors as we don’t aim to rank other
anti-malware products.
Independent Test by a Third Party To avoid any bias regarding testing
IntelliAV, we requested a third-party independent anti-malware testing orga-
nization to assess our tool. The test performed on a test suit involving 500 most
common and recent Android malware, which all have been first seen by Virus-
Total in 2017 —more recent than the samples in our training test. Interestingly,
as is shown in Figure 5, IntelliAV can successfully classify 478 of the sam-
ples as malware, i.e., 96% malware detection rate. Except for Fakeapp family,
IntelliAV achieves very good results on the rest of malware families. As spec-
imens in Fakeapp family regularly abuse legitimate application by repackaging
them, the presence of more benign characteristics in such malware seems to be
the main reason of misclassification.
To measure the false positive rate, IntelliAV was tested on 50 benign appli-
cations that have been downloaded more than 10,000 times from Google Play, as
well as were not tagged as malware by any anti-malware product. Two out of the
50 apps were misclassified by IntelliAV. However, one of the two misclassified
samples has been removed from Google Play recently. Although the main reason
for elimination is not clear, the application surely violates some of the Google
Play policies and IntelliAV seems to detect such a kind of violation perfectly.
5.3 Stop Droppers on Device
Dynamic code loading techniques are employed by both the benign and malicious
applications [49,50]. There are different techniques to dynamically load a piece of
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Fig. 5: Results of the independent test on IntelliAV in July 2017. BD and TR
refer to backdoor and trojan respectively. The detection rate is separated based
on the malware families as well.
code in Android applications, and the technique that turns to be more popular
among malware developers has not been yet clearly evaluated. However, there
are many reports by anti-malware vendors [51,52] that designates APK installa-
tion technique, also known as droppers, as one of the most popular approaches
by which attackers deliver a malware. A dropper is a malware installer that sur-
reptitiously carries any kind of malicious software so they can be executed on
the compromised machine. They do not carry any malicious activities by them-
selves, but they just open a way for the attack by downloading/decompressing
and then installing the core malware payload onto a target machine without
detection. Depending on the way they retrieve the payload, i.e., by downloading
or decompressing, they might be called Downloader Trojans or Wrappers.
The overall technique employed by droppers is summarized in Figure 6. The
upper part of the figure is the overall scheme of the attack technique, and the
bottom part is showing how IntelliAV can stop this attack on the device when
the malware has to reveal its full capabilities while offline machine learning
techniques would fail. To dissect this attack vector in more detail, we evaluate
a very recent dropper Android malware, which was reported in July 2017 by
Trendmicro [51]. This malware misleads users to install a secondary app by
showing a fake message. When the dropper app6 is launched, an error pops
6 Dropper APK MD5: d774ebb94991b252d7723894e7d00e92
DropperAPK DroppedAPK
Drop
Decode thewrapped payload froma resource/asset inside the dropper
Download the payload from Internet
Fig. 6: Detecting dropper attacks by IntelliAV on the device. Offline machine
learning techniques would fail to detect this kind of attack. The example is a
very recent Android malware, which was reported in July 2017 by Trendmicro
[51]
out that: “Sorry, the application is not compatible with your android version”.
Meanwhile, it decodes a string from the APK resource file, which is actually a
malicious APK7, and requests the user to install it. As the dropper does not
contain malicious activities and just needs one permission to drop the secondary
APK, IntelliAV does not produce any risk alert. However, before the user is
infected by the dropped APK, they can request IntelliAV to scan it before
installation (i.e., by its custom scan capability), which results in the detection
of the real malicious app.
It is obvious that IntelliAV can generalize this detection and prevention
approach to any malware that uses APK installation technique. Another example
is an Android malware8, reported by an ESET researcher [52], that asks just for
the storage permission to save the the secondary loaded malicious APK9. After
the first APK executes, it immediately drops the secondary APK, embedded in
an image located in an APK asset, and requests the user to install it. In another
7 Dropped APK MD5: 51f1549da5b3f182bb3454d3e9d5c88a
8 Dropper APK MD5: 1f41ba0781d51751971ee705dfa307d2
9 Dropped APK MD5: 90886b56372f5191a78a20dcb3f9fe6e
report by the same vendor, a dropper10 is a kind of logic bomb [53] and drops a
malicious apk11 twenty minutes after the first run [54].
More advanced offline machine learning techniques relying on static analy-
sis, even those deeply look inside an APK to find an embedded malware like
DroidSieve [9], cannot model all of the feasible dropping techniques because the
secondary app can be concealed by custom methods. Although offline approaches
relying on dynamic analysis [55] might be able to detect this kind of attack if
they are system-centric and designed perfectly to disclose logic bombs, there has
not been any research specifically to address this issue.
5.4 Robustness against Obfuscation
Obfuscation techniques [56,57] are widely used by both the benign and ma-
licious Android applications to protect themselves against reverse engineering.
Although it is clear that there is no bulletproof approach, a formidable detection
system should not be influenced by obfuscation dramatically. Hence, to evaluate
the resiliency of IntelliAV, we employ a recently released obfuscation frame-
work, namely AVPASS [58], that has been shown to be able to evade almost
all of the commercial Android anti-malware products. AVPASS uses different
common obfuscation techniques to encrypt and remove/add features from/to an
application. These techniques are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Obfuscation techniques used for evaluating IntelliAV. These techniques
preserve the original functionality of the application. The techniques like remov-
ing permissions are not considered here as they destroy the functionality of the
application.
Obfuscation Type Affect on IntelliAV
1 Insert dummy bytes between all instructions 7
2 Insert benign permissions to AnadroidManifest.xml Possible
3 Image file obfuscation 7
4 Change variables name 7
5 Modify user-defined class/package name 7
6 Insert API between two existing APIs Possible
7 Encrypt strings 7
8 API hiding by Java Reflection Possible
9 Resource XML obfuscation 7
Among the aforementioned obfuscation techniques, three of them might di-
rectly affect on IntelliAV, and they are 1) adding benign permissions, 2) hiding
APIs by Java reflection, and 3) inserting APIs. To realize how much the tech-
niques in Table 6 can undermine IntelliAV, we randomly select ten small size
10 Dropper APK MD5: add7572e94b54bb408d34c8c19972b0c
11 Dropped APK MD5: 243028fe2a1a9358187d6e694343fcd9
Android malware (see Table 6). The main reason of being small size is that em-
ploying all of the obfuscation techniques needs a huge processing time and large
sized apps cannot be done on a laptop.
We investigate IntelliAV in two different scenarios, i.e., testing on the ten
original malware as well as testing on the obfuscated variant of the malware.
Then, we use the identical approach for testing the samples against those anti-
malware products that are accessible in Virus Total. Interestingly, IntelliAV
is completely robust against all of the obfuscation techniques in Table 6. While
the obfuscated variant can simply evade most of the anti-viruses, evasion from
IntelliAV needs more elaborate efforts. Among the anti-malware that have de-
tected the obfuscated variant, three of them performs very well. However, it
seems that they fingerprint AVPASS footsteps because they detect even a be-
nign app, obfuscated by AVPASS, as a malware. Moreover, they use the same
family name from all the obfuscated malware by AVPASS. In this case, if an
attacker applies a custom obfuscation/evasion technique, they can readily dodge
not carefully crafted anti-malware products. It is worth to mention that none of
the antimalware, which have claimed they are based on machine learning, are
able to detect more than five samples. This evaluation again arises the atten-
tion toward the lack of either use of machine learning or generalization of the
detection model.
Table 7: Point to point comparison of IntelliAV and VirusTotal on some ran-
domly selected malware as well as obfuscated variant of the malware. The per-
centage numbers show the risk score calculated by IntelliAV. The VT column
shows the number of anti-malware vendors that are able to detect a malware
before and after obfuscation. Almost all of the anti-malware products have diffi-
culty to detect the obfuscated malware. There are three anti-malware that able
to detect most of obfuscated malware. However, it seems that they fingerprint
AVPASS as they detect even obfuscated benign apps by AVPASS as malware.
The test has been performed on VT in early August, 2017.
Original Malware Obfuscated Variant
# MD5 IntelliAV VT IntelliAV VT
1 60806c69e0f4643609dcdf127c8e7ef5 82% (3) 31/59 84% (3) 4/60
2 4e91ff9ac7e3e349b5b9fe36fb505cb4 87% (3) 34/60 75% (3) 4/61
3 26b8a840b4cc15d0b05533705d21854b 100% (3) 43/60 98% (3) 3/61
4 19723d489712cff0ea2907f142937b8b 100% (3) 40/62 84% (3) 5/61
5 4760ac11bf995d26c0486cf3b73f5f9a 100% (3) 43/61 92% (3) 6/60
6 0085ae9415d115a6bde1e9ff72b6dc7f 100% (3) 43/59 98% (3) 3/60
7 9eebbc312fa1cdc891e151f367e6bd9d 84% (3) 31/61 81% (3) 8/59
8 711d00941aa78e912051d644f84748be 100% (3) 31/62 98% (3) 7/61
9 cabdc04298dbf6bce3857328d24c96dd 100% (3) 38/61 84% (3) 6/58
10 a0113b794e69d7ca1d603aadf977b8a7 100% (3) 46/60 92% (3) 7/61
5.5 IntelliAV Overhead on Device
Despite the belief that running a detection model on mobile devices is computa-
tionally infeasible, we acknowledge the efficiency of IntelliAV by exposing the
time consumption for the feature extraction as well as the classification phases.
We select some popular medium/large-sized applications and analyze them by
IntelliAV on three devices with different technical specifications. The three mo-
bile devices used for the reported experiments are a Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge
(released in April, 2015), a Huawei P8 Lite (released in May, 2015), and an LG
D280 L65 (released in June, 2014), which respectively have 3GB, 2GB, and 1GB
of RAM. In addition, we computed the time required on the Android Emulator
that is dispatched along with Android Studio. The time is simply computed by
specifying a timer before starting the feature extraction procedure, that stops
when the features from both the manifest and the dex code are extracted. For
classification, the reported time refers to the interval between the time in which
the feature vector is passed to the model, and the time of production of the
risk score. The time required to load the model is negligible, and so we are not
reporting it for the sake of clarity.
As shown in Table 8, the time required to analyze even large applications
is less than 10 seconds, which makes IntelliAV practical and reasonable as
the number of installed applications on each device is not too large, and the
computational power of mobile devices is increasing even on cheap models. The
classification part is performed in native code, that provides a fast execution.
As expected, it can be noted that the largest fraction of the time required by
IntelliAV is spent for feature extraction, especially for the extraction of the
API features. Extraction of API features is even much slower in the case an
application is made up of multiple dex files. For instance, the Uber app is made
up of 10 dex files, so that searching for a specific API requires much more time
compared to applications having just one dex file.
6 Limitations
As far as IntelliAV is based on static analysis, it inherits some of the well-known
limitations of static analysis approaches. For instance, although we partially ad-
dressed dynamic code loading techniques, the more complicated one, which hides
the malicious behavior in the native code, might affect our system. Moreover,
in the current proposed implementation, IntelliAV cannot detect the malicious
actions executed by JavaScript. In addition, we are aware that the system can
be a victim of evasion techniques against the learning approach, such as mimicry
attacks that let an attacker inject some data to the app so that its features resem-
ble the ones of benign apps [59,60,61]. Consequently, more methodological and
experimental analysis will be needed to make a quantitative evaluation of the ro-
bustness of IntelliAV in an adversarial environment, to provide the system with
the required hardening. Nonetheless, we believe that the good performance of
the proposed system against a few obfuscation techniques (e.g., adding benign
permissions/APIs as well as hiding APIs) is a good starting point for further
Table 8: Overhead of IntelliAV on different devices for very large applications.
F.E. refers to feature extraction time and C. refers to classification time. The
number in parenthesis shows the RAM size of the device.
Galaxy S6 Edge Huawei P8 Lite LG D280 L65 Emulator
Marshmallow (3GB) Lollipop (2GB) KitKat (1GB) Marshmallow (1.5GB)
App APK Size (MB) F.E. (s) C. (s) F.E. (s) C. (s) F.E. (s) C. (s) F.E. (s) C. (s)
Google Trips 8.19 0.67 0.003 0.82 0.005 3.86 0.012 0.43 0.001
LinkedIn Pulse 12.9 1.28 0.003 1.14 0.005 4.40 0.012 0.55 0.001
Stack Exchange 8.15 1.27 0.004 1.27 0.006 5.13 0.014 0.60 0.001
Telegram 12.41 1.36 0.005 1.74 0.007 5.52 0.016 0.69 0.002
WhatsApp 27.97 2.29 0.006 3.22 0.008 12.91 0.018 1.10 0.002
SoundCloud 33.14 2.67 0.006 2.84 0.008 11.83 0.018 1.14 0.002
Spotify 34.65 2.51 0.006 3.03 0.008 13.67 0.018 1.22 0.002
Twitter 31.77 4.53 0.004 5.95 0.006 24.46 0.016 2.26 0.002
LinkedIn 40.39 4.67 0.004 4.69 0.006 16.73 0.016 2.40 0.001
Airbnb 54.34 8.24 0.006 8.79 0.008 35.71 0.018 4.23 0.002
Messenger 59.43 5.85 0.011 7.94 0.013 19.13 0.028 3.35 0.004
Uber 37.26 6.66 0.004 7.64 0.006 43.88 0.016 4.29 0.002
Average 30.05 3.50 0.005 4.08 0.007 16.43 0.016 1.86 0.002
development. Moreover, employing the multiple classifier systems approaches,
considering a larger number of semantic features, as well as performing a fine-
grained classifier parameter tuning, can provide a degree of robustness against
adversarial attacks against the machine learning engine.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this work, we investigated the practicality of building a learning-based anti-
malware tool for the devices running Android platform. To consider both the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the tool, we emphasize on a careful selection
of a set of lightweight features, as well as a solid training phase. The reported
results show that IntelliAV is robust against common obfuscation techniques.
In addition, as far as IntelliAV runs on the device, it can track and scan all
downloaded, dropped, and installed apps on the fly, which makes it more robust
compared to off-device systems. Our tool will be freely available so that it can
help the end user to provide easy protection on the device, as well as allowing
researchers to better explore the idea of having intelligent security systems on
mobile devices. As a future plan, we aim to address the limitations of IntelliAV,
to improve its robustness against attacks on the machine learning engine, while
keeping the efficiency intact.
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